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In the early years of this century, Carl Becker, reacting against the prevalent 
academic trends of his time, emphasized that the American Revolution was 
not simply a movement of political independence from Great Britain, but had 
internal implications as well. Becker's famous phrase to describe the twin 
thrusts of the Revolution, "Home rule and who shall rule at home", has be-
come something of a bromide. Nevertheless, much of what is being written 
about the Revolution at the time of the Bicentennial celebrations still fits 
into Becker's categories, although the discussion has become more subtle and 
sophisticated. The movement for political independence remains recognized 
as having been mainly the concern of the ruling elites in Britain and America, 
while in the colonies the forces which the elite unleashed by challenging 
Britain often got out of its control. Some of the internal struggles were be-
tween various factions of the elite, but others involved groups in colonial 
society — particularly small farmers and urban artisans — opposed to the 
conservative values and assumptions of the traditional leadership. The 
planters, professional men (especially lawyers), and urban merchants who 
had pretty much controlled colonial American politics, thus found they had 
to contend simultaneously with Britain and with new and more "popular" 
leaders attempting to put into practice the egalitarian rhetoric used to oppose 
British rule. 
What is new about some of the recent scholarship is the discovery of yet 
another layer of conflict, aspiration, and activity to add to the old formulation. 
The nineteenth century thought the elite leaders spoke for the people. 
Historians of the first half of the twentieth century found public opinion 
more complex, but still confined their analyses to the politically enfranchised. 
Now it is being recognized that the so-called "popular" leadership of the rising 
middle class itself spoke only for a very limited percentage of the American 
population, uninterested as it was in the aspirations of women, Negro slaves 
and freedmen, recent immigrants, many frontier farmers, religious minorities, 
Amerindians, and an urban proletariat. A new generation of scholarship is 
trying to explain the relationship to the revolutionary movement of the 
foregoing disparate group which has — perhaps unfortunately — come to be 
labelled "the inarticulate", and which constituted as much as 80% of the 
* This essay was solicited as a special tribute to the American Bicentennial. — Editor's note. 
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population of America at the time of the Declaration of Independence. 
Despite the new revisionism, the mainstream of writing about the American 
Revolution continues to concentrate on the conflict with Britain and the 
creation of an independent United States.1 This aspect of the Revolution is 
plainly the most attractive one to those who seek, consciously or uncon-
sciously, to find something positive and affirmative in the American experi-
ence. For most historians working the independence vein, American society 
was the most virtuous in the western world, having progressed further along 
the road of political and economic equality than any other, particularly 
mother Britain herself. For many scholars, America embodied an overseas 
extension of Britain purged of the worst features of political and social 
injustice built into British life in the mid-eighteenth century. In short, the 
American colonies represented the best of British ideals, and political inde-
pendence was an essentially conservative movement, seeking not so much to 
produce something radically different as to preserve something rather 
unique and good from British blundering and injustice. 
Such a thoroughly affirmative view of American society and the Revolu-
tion is well illustrated in the Bicentennial contributions of two of America's 
most distinguished senior historians, Bernhard Knollenberg and Carl 
Bridenbaugh. Knollenberg's Growth of the American Revolution 1766-1775 
(New York and London, The Free Press, 1975), published posthumously, 
seems almost to come from another century. Like his highly praised Origin 
of the American Revolution 1759-1765 (New York and London, The Free 
Press, 1960), this sequel is both brilliant and exasperating. A lawyer by 
training and profession, Knollenberg in his work offers the reader a 
thoroughly-documented legal brief for American opposition to Great 
Britain. He never wavers in his assumption that the leaders of colonial 
protest to British policies spoke for the vast majority of Americans. 
The case for that protest has seldom been better made. The British 
Parliament was, on Knollenberg's account, ill-informed, stupid, acting 
illegally and unconstitutionally some of the time and provocatively all of the 
time. From a reader's perspective, this new book suffers painfully from its 
author's approach, containing as it does only 196 pages of text, 70 pages of 
appendices, and nearly 250 pages of notes (including notes to the appendices). 
One can get overwhelmed in the scholarly apparatus, and the end result more 
resembles the report of a royal commission than an evening's light reading. 
Its relative inaccessibility to the casual reader is unfortunate since the work 
is indispensible for the matters it considers. Conscious of his proclivities, 
1 It must be emphasized that the literature discussed in this essay represents a personal 
selection from an enormous outpouring. I have tried to choose representative works for 
consideration, but have not attempted to present an exhaustive and all-inclusive listing of 
Bicentennial publications. 
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Knollenberg himself playfully suggests visualizing the book as an eighteenth-
century production subtitled "Being an Account of a Majority of the People 
of the Thirteen Colonies Who Rebelled against Great Britain in 1775, 
together with a description of the Provocative Conduct of the British Parlia-
ment and Government Accounting for this Change and the Colonists' Re-
sponses to the said Conduct". In the face of such candour, it is hard to be 
overly critical. 
At first glance, Carl Bridenbaugh's The Spirit of '76: The Growth of Ameri-
can Patriotism Before Independence 1607-1776 (New York, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1975) seems quite a different matter. Bridenbaugh is a master 
essayist, and his little book is well-written and thoroughly entertaining. 
It is an evening's good read. But like Knollenberg, Bridenbaugh seems to 
speak from another age, when poor folks knew their place and stayed in it. 
He paints American culture with a broad brush, using the apt quotation from 
often obscure sources to telling advantage. The finished canvas certainly 
offers a charming view of a relatively unified and thoroughly American popu-
lation on the Eve of Independence. 
Equally affirmative glimpses of the revolutionary era can be found in many 
of the papers published by the Library of Congress, representing the annual 
contributions to a series of symposia held at the Library beginning in 1972. 
The themes chosen by the organizers of the symposia were hardly very ad-
venturous, and did not encourage straying from the trite and true. In Funda-
mental Testaments of the American Revolution (Washington, Library of Con-
gress, 1973), for example, four of the most respected names in American 
academia offer their views on subjects about which they have written else-
where at length. Bernard Bailyn, whose work on the pamphlet literature of 
the Revolution has established him as the leading authority on its ideological 
and political origins, considers Paine's Common Sense. Not surprisingly, 
Bailyn finds "something unique in the intellectual idiom of the pamphlet", 
although he does not really attempt to explain why "the dominant tone of 
Common Sense is that of rage" rather than the more common legalistic self-
justification. Cecilia Kenyon, discussing the Declaration of Independence, 
notes but does not explore the ironical fact that "slavery should have shar-
pened Jefferson's perceptions about the mutual relationships of morality, 
consensus, economic status, freedom, and republican government". Merrill 
Jensen, whose graduate students at the University of Wisconsin have long 
been in the vanguard of revisionism about the rhetorical inconsistencies 
and practical repressions of the revolutionary era, manages to make the 
Articles of Confederation a logical triumph of consensus politics. And finally, 
Richard B. Morris sees the Treaty of Paris as a victory for American diplo-
macy, drawing modern parallels by explicitly comparing the American posi-
tion with that of the Algerian nationalists negotiating their independence 
from the French government. 
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The parallels of Morris point up one of the most poignant problems* of the 
American Bicentennial, shared to some degree by all the participants in this 
particular symposium held in 1973 and by all those writing about the Revolu-
tion. How can the eighteenth-century American experience be related to the 
world in the twentieth century?2 If, as Bailyn asserts here and elsewhere, 
the American Revolution was not "a result of intolerable social or economic 
conditions", was not "deliberately undertaken to recast the social order", 
what is its relationship to modern revolutions which are? How can it be 
viewed except in isolation? Bailyn, it must be added, is not afraid of the 
implications of his arguments, and has consistently maintained that the 
Revolution was, as it were, sui generis.* But even he has occasionally felt 
obliged to defend the Founders from the charge of unenlightened self-
interest.4 It remains difficult not to be conscious of the present, and even 
more difficult to reconcile both the American past and modern American 
policy with the revolutionary impulses of the people of Algeria or North 
Vietnam, not to mention the blacks in Rhodesia, South Africa, or the United 
States. Bailyn's position is less fraught with danger than that of Morris, for 
surely a large share of the problems of American foreign policy results from 
the inability of the United States to jettison its so-called revolutionary heri-
tage. It might be salutary for Americans to remember that the white govern-
ment of Rhodesia sees itself as the legitimate heir of the American revolu-
tionaries. It might be equally salutary, though probably impossible, for 
Americans to admit to themselves that their formative experiences were both 
unique and essentially elitist. 
Some scholars have unabashedly concentrated on the elites of the revolu-
tionary period, often in combination with modern techniques of quantitative 
analysis. The most ambitious of these studies, James Kirby Martin's Men in 
Rebellion: Higher Governmental Leaders and the Coming of the American 
Revolution (paperback edition, New York and London, The Free Press, 
1976), is based on computer analysis of the biographical profiles of some 487 
colonial and revolutionary officials in the provinces, divided into three 
subgroups: the late colonial executives, the loyalist executives, and the 
revolutionary executives. Computerized collective biography is a fashionable 
2 See, for example, the comments in The Impact of the American Revolution Abroad (Wash-
ington, Library of Congress, 1975), particularly those of R. R. Palmer, p. 7; Erich Angermann, 
p. 162; and Nagayo Homma, pp. 164-6. 
3 Bernard Bailyn, "Lines of Force in Recent Writings on the American Revolution", paper 
presented at the XIV International Congress of Historical Sciences, San Francisco, 1975. 
Another paper at the same session of Congress by E. J. Hobsbawm, entitled "Revolution", 
discussed the general topic without once mentioning America. 
4 Bernard Bailyn, "The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation", 
in S. G. Kurtz and J. H. Hutson, eds., Essays on the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, the 
University of North Carolina Press, 1973), pp. 3-31. 
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technique these days, and this book is symptomatic of its limitations. Most 
of Martin's work documents in statistical percentages what we have always 
known about the small group of officeholders in the late colonial/revolution-
ary period. 
While many executives held their power from the provincial assemblies 
and their communities, others held it from the Crown. The former were more 
likely to be revolutionaries, the latter more likely to be loyalists. Fewer 
officials were replaced by the Revolution in colonies which had electoral 
systems. Loyalists tended to be involved in the imperial orbit, patriots in the 
local. All officials were above average in wealth, loyalists being slightly 
better off. Loyalists were less likely to have deep family roots in the colony 
of their office (because so many were placemen appointed from without), 
and less likely to belong to the dominant local church. Revolutionary execu-
tives (those after 1775) were slightly less wealthy, of less distinguished 
parentage, less inter-related by family, and less frequently college-educated. 
But only slightly. Although Martin prefers to stress the differences, the fact 
remains that the Revolution brought little change in leadership patterns to the 
independent state governments. The Revolution may have, as the author 
asserts, opened state offices to more men of community-level leadership, but 
they hardly constituted a new class of colonial society. 
Not surprisingly, since he has focussed on a familiar elite, Martin also con-
cludes that the crux of the Revolution was the need of some of its members 
for "room at the top". His assumption is that when men's career ambitions 
are frustrated, they feel forced to break the system by rebellion. But why 
co-ordinate activities, and why turn against Britain? A series of provincial 
power struggles within the framework of professed loyalty to the Empire, 
such as occurred in British North America in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, seems equally likely in terms of elite career ambitions, and does not 
run the risk of treason. Curiously, Martin does not test his hypotheses by in-
cluding a control group of executives from Quebec, Nova Scotia, and the 
West Indies, those colonies which did not rebel. What were patterns like 
there? Finally, Men in Rebellion is not redeemed by graceful writing, and is 
almost a classic of the new social science approach to history in its abysmal 
literary style. Too much energy probably went into the charts and graphs, 
which few readers ever examine. 
A more successful, perhaps because more modest, elite study is Richard 
D. Brown's "The Founding Fathers of 1776 and 1787: A Collective View".5 
The ages of marriage and size of families of these elites were closer to 
British peerage norms than to the profiles of average Americans, suggesting 
some of the ways in which such men were moving in a European direction 
at the same time they were "Americanizing". As Brown admits, during the 
5 William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XXXIII (1976), pp. 465-80. 
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revolutionary period "national leaders were already a group set apart", 
though he prefers to emphasize their heterogeneity rather than their ruling 
class homogeneity. His data could certainly be employed to support the con-
clusion that the revolutionary elites came from a remarkably narrow and 
essentially untypical segment of colonial society, though to do so would 
require some concept of social stratification which American colonialists 
have always been reluctant to employ. 
Related to the elite study is what we can call the "elite narrative", des-
cribing what this small group was doing. An excellent example is David 
Ammerman's In the Common Cause: American Response to the Coercive 
Acts of 1774 (Charlottesville, Va., University of Virginia Press, 1974). In his 
preface, Ammerman protests that "It is not my intention to swell the ranks 
of the so-called consensus historians". He acknowledges that "Large numbers 
of Americans were unrepresented at the meetings of the First Continental 
Congress", but insists that "little is known about their attitudes". According 
to Ammerman, the men of the First Congress were "surprisingly unified" (why 
surprisingly, given their similar backgrounds?), and the Revolution "was 
successful precisely because the sympathy of so large a percentage of the 
colonists was wedded to the cause of resistance in the initial phases" (how to 
reconcile this with the absence of knowledge of the attitudes of the many 
unrepresented at the Congress?). One suspects that Ammerman's unrepre-
sented are not the politically unenfranchised population, but those voters 
who lived in colonies which did not send delegates. 
If Ammerman's study is not consensus-oriented, it is certainly American-
oriented. In a scholarly book published in 1974 which seeks to deal with the 
Coercive Acts, it is discouraging to find the Quebec Act lumped in with the 
Massachusetts Acts virtually without discrimination. Ammerman notes that 
the Quebec Act had "been under preparation for some time", and allows that 
it "owed its inclusion among the Coercive Acts more to chances of timing 
than to events in Massachusetts Bay". But he then proceeds to discuss the 
provisions of the Quebec Act as Americans perceived them without the 
faintest recognition of two generations of Canadian scholarship which have 
attempted to show that the Act was not intended to put down the Americans 
but to resolve problems in Quebec. 
The Quebec Act may have been another illustration of Ammerman's 
assertion that the British "seem to have done almost everything wrong", but 
it also illustrates that by 1774 it was extremely difficult for Britain to govern 
her North American Empire and do anything right. There may have been 
nothing inevitable about the Revolution, and scholars may well be guilty of 
Ammerman's charge of confusing general conditions of unrest with the 
specific development of events which precipitated the war, but his treatment 
of the Quebec Act well demonstrates the problem of keeping the general and 
the specific neatly compartmentalized. The specific American misunderstand-
Acadiensis 9 
ing of the motivations and intentions of the government regarding Quebec was 
rooted in the general conditions of hostility to the British Parliament which 
had been building up for years. This work is like a narrative of a marital 
breakup which begins when the couple start throwing dishes at one another, 
and is written from the perspective of only one of the estranged parties. 
An American perspective like Knollenberg's or Ammerman's can best be 
corrected by reading the work of British historians. The Bicentennial has had 
its spill-over across the water, and eighteenth-century British political 
history, in something of the doldrums in recent years, has sprung back to life. 
The British have always been unabashedly and perhaps necessarily elitist 
in their political analysis of the revolutionary era, anchored by the seminal 
work of Sir Lewis Namier on the structure of eighteenth-century British 
politics. Namier, although using the term "American Revolution" in the title 
of one of his major works, was not really interested in either North America 
or its grievances, but in the British political institutions which had to cope 
with them.6 There have been some recent attempts to break down the Namier 
paradigm, particularly John Brewer's Party Ideology and Popular Politics 
at the Accession of George HI (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1976), which argues that there was a public opinion in early Georgian 
England. Namier, of course, was not concerned with ideology; he did not 
bother much about public opinion of any sort outside the narrow corridors 
of power. Party Ideology is a well-informed and important work, although its 
author is hard-pressed to demonstrate that the ideas of the considerable 
political pamphleteering he so fully and carefully details had much impact on 
public policy. The work is perhaps better seen as explaining the origins of 
British politics during the French Revolution (when these ideas did matter) 
than its popular dimensions during the beginnings of the American. 
More traditionally, P. D. G. Thomas has provided a careful assessment of 
British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First Phase of the American 
Revolution, 1763-1767 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1975). For those 
reading regularly the specialist monographs in this field, there are few sur-
prises. But Thomas is in superb control of the primary and secondary litera-
ture, and his synthesis is a must for any reader who would seek to understand 
the British position. As Thomas emphasizes, there was precious little division 
in political Britain on the main American issues of the 1760s, particularly the 
supremacy of Parliament. The British saw their colonial policy as reasonable, 
flexible, generous, and enlightened. Americans were misled into believing 
they had real friends among the political leadership by decisions resulting 
from internal factionalizing and accident, and the "American lobby" in 
Britain was used by the politicians largely to legitimize actions taken for other 
6 See England in the Age of the American Revolution (London, 1930) and The Structure of 
Politics at the Accession of George III (2 vol., London, 1929). 
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reasons. The Americans could — and did — work themselves up to a rebel-
lion, while the British government's essential position about the colonies 
remained unchanged from 1763 onwards. When Thomas's unified leaders 
met Ammerman's, an explosion was almost inevitable. 
A wide gap between American and British attitudes toward colonies and 
their place in the Empire existed and was never bridged in the period from 
the Peace of Paris in 1763 to the Declaration of Independence, and it has not 
in some senses ever been bridged in the subsequent two centuries of historical 
debate. In an attempt to promote better understanding, the British scholar 
Ian Christie and the American Benjamin Woods Labaree have produced 
Empire or Independence, 1760-1776: A British-American Dialogue on the 
Coming of the American Revolution (Oxford, Phaidon Press, 1976). The title 
is more than a bit misleading, for the authors have not let us into their 
studies to view their disagreements with one another. Indeed, there are none. 
We have not a dialogue, but a collaboration, each scholar in turn treating 
his side of the water. Not surprisingly, the authors spend more time in 
Britain at the beginning, more time in America at the end, and observe that 
the British side has only one perspective — Whitehall — while the American 
side is far more disparate. Had Woods and Labaree been in charge, there 
would have been no Revolution, for they simply agreed to disagree. 
In real life disagreement led ultimately to war. Remarkably little good 
military history has come out of the Bicentennial, in marked contrast to the 
Civil War anniversary of a few years back, which produced detailed analyses 
of every major and not a few minor battles, generals, and regiments. One 
possible explanation is the American reaction to Vietnam; "drum and trum-
pet" history is not very fashionable in the United States today. But as John 
Shy points out in one of the articles in his collection of reprinted pieces, 
A People Numerous and Armed; Reflections on the Military Struggle for 
American Independence (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1976), the war 
was "a political education conducted by military means". Of all the many 
wrong decisions the British government took, the one to settle the dispute 
with the colonies on the battlefield was the most dangerous, the most futile, 
and the most final. 
Excellent evidence for the futility of the British decision of 1775 comes 
from R. Arthur Bowler's Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in 
America 1775-1783 (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1975), one 
of the most important works of the recent literature on the Revolution. 
Bowler is not concerned with armies fighting but with armies eating, a subject 
which at first glance seems dull and prosaic. But his book is a gem of insight 
and careful writing. What he shows is that the British quickly realized that 
they could not supply their armies from American sources, and indeed never 
did so. Much British military caution — so heavily criticized then and 
since — was legitimate prudence given logistical inadequacies and the assump-
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tion that British armies could not live off the countryside. The latter assump-
tion, observes Bowler, was both principled and pragmatic. A marauding 
army made enemies of the populace in its wake, however previously disposed 
those people were toward it and the authority it represented, a problem 
the Americans faced in Quebec, when they attempted to take the offensive. 
While, on the whole, the British success in supplying at times over 40,000 
people — including civilian dependents — was, given eighteenth-century 
standards, very impressive indeed, it was not enough. Serious offensives 
were impossible, and without them the British position could only deteriorate 
despite constant improvement in the supply situation. 
Like Bowler's book, Jonathan Gregory Rossie's The Politics of Command 
in the American Revolution (Syracuse, N. Y., Syracuse University Press, 
1975) is a military study in which few shots are fired (except at one obscure 
colonel in an unsuccessful assassination attempt and in several private duels). 
As his title suggests, Rossie is concerned with the political dimension of 
military leadership in the Continental Army, well demonstrating that the 
American generals owed their positions to civilian politicians operating in 
political rather than military terms. Rossie argues that civilian interference 
diffused the army's command structure — generals had to keep looking back 
over their shoulders at Congress and the state legislatures. Since the only 
generals springing readily to mind who did not have to look over their shoul-
ders were those of the Russian tsars and the American presidents of the past 
ten years, neither terribly successful militarily, insecurity was probably a 
good thing. The Americans did not need to win the war, merely not to lose it, 
and successful politics was more important than great victories. Eventually, 
in frustration the generals began to conspire against one another, a Con-
gressional triumph of no small proportions. 
Welcome also is George F. G. Stanley's Canada Invaded 1775-1776 
(Toronto, Hakkert, 1973). Too much of the story of the Quebec campaigns 
has been told from the American perspective, usually not conceptually 
different than Justin Smith's Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony (New 
York, 1907), the title of which is self-explanatory. As Stanley himself admits, 
his book is really only an introductory sketch. But it is worth recalling that 
the Americans were engaged in territorial expansion (in the name of "libera-
tion") before they had declared themselves independent from Britain, and 
that they were not very successful, partly because the habitants of Quebec 
did not co-operate. 
If the military dimension has received less attention than anticipated from 
the Bicentennial, so too has the economic. Perhaps the most interesting book 
on the subject to appear on the American side of the Atlantic is J. E. Crowley's 
This Sheba Self: The Conceptualization of Economic Life in Eighteenth-
Century America (Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1974). Crowley is less concerned with economic policies than with public 
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perceptions of economic matters, relying heavily on the literary evidence of 
pamphlets, sermons, and newspapers. His conclusions obviously extend no 
further than the self-conscious producers and consumers of this literature, 
mainly the commercialized upper layers of colonial society who made the 
Revolution. This elite was certainly ambivalent about its relationship to the 
economic world, particularly since that world was rapidly changing. But 
Crowley's tensions and ambivalences often sound too much like those of the 
typical twentieth-century intellectual, guiltily concerned about the dichotomy 
between material progress and the loss of virtue through self-indulgence. 
One wonders whether all colonials really agonized over such matters, whether 
subsistence farmers (by implication) were more virtuous and happier, and 
what the exploited thought. Nevertheless, Crowley quite rightly points out 
that the self-denial of colonial economic opposition to Britain — such as 
non-importation — made good sense to the elites in psychological as well as 
political terms, and that the period of the Revolution saw little separation 
of the moral from the economic dimension. In terms of the way men saw their 
economic selves, the Industrial Revolution was far more potent than the 
American. 
On the British side, T. M. Devine's The Tobacco Lords: A Study of the 
Tobacco Merchants of Glasgow and Their Trading Activities c. 1740-1790 
(Edinburgh, John Donald, 1975) brings a breath of fresh air and common 
sense into the tangled tale of the overseas commercial implications of the 
Revolution. Devine finds that the Glasgow tobacco merchants suffered very 
little from American Independence, in either the short or the long run, 
despite the continually perplexing problem of Southern planter indebtedness. 
His arguments are the more convincing because he is not primarily involved 
in Revolution historical debates but in the question of the formation of 
capital in Scotland, and hence has no particular axe to grind. The merchants 
were accustomed to colonial instability, and built it into their considera-
tions. Perhaps the significant point to be gained from Devine's study is that 
the American planters had a quite inflated notion of their own importance 
in the imperial commercial economy. With full warehouses and a burgeoning 
domestic market, the Scottish tobacco magnates were not very sensitive to 
American pressure in the critical last months before the opening of actual 
hostilities. The importance of commercial pressure upon the British govern-
ment (and the need for it) has been vastly overemphasized in recent years, 
and this book helps to provide a healthy corrective. 
Like military and economic history, individual biography has not been 
particularly prominent in the Bicentennial literature, to some extent because 
many major projects were already well in hand. While the papers of most of 
the founding fathers have been appearing in carefully edited multi-volume 
editions over the past twenty-five years, a product of American affluence and 
academic entrepreneurialism rather than special occasions, Richard B. 
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Morris's edition of John Jay: The Making of a Revolutionary: Unpublished 
Papers 1745-1780 (New York, Harper and Row, 1975) was published to co-
incide with the Bicentennial. One can hardly hope to review in a paragraph 
an 800 page collection of primary documents, and perhaps it would suffice 
to emphasize the nature of the enterprise, so characteristic of one facet of 
American scholarship in recent years. Jay is an important figure, though 
hardly in the same league as Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, and John 
Adams. His papers, like most of those of the early American statesmen, 
were not preserved intact in family muniment rooms and have had to be 
collected from all over the world at great effort and expense. The result is a 
collection at Columbia University of 5000 manuscript Jay items (all with 
xeroxed copies) and 10,000 photocopied items. This project of considerable 
magnitude and substantial funding here presents new Jay material for the 
early years, carefully annotated by Morris, an associate editor, and two 
assistant editors. It is difficult to think of a comparable project for a Canadian 
statesman of equal (or greater) stature. 
By far the most interesting study of a major patriot to emerge from the 
Bicentennial lists is Peter Shaw's The Character of John Adams (Chapel Hill, 
N.C., University of North Carolina Press, 1976). Adams, of course, had 
already been served by an edition of his writings, several major biographies, 
and a judicious (and scrupulously overannotated) edition of unpublished 
papers, the last helping to move him from secondary to primary status in the 
pantheon of revolutionary leaders. This latest study, therefore, can build 
on considerable past scholarship, and is less concerned with what Adams did 
than with how and why he did it. In its emphasis on the inner Adams, Shaw's 
work is very much a product of our own times, and, while the author tries 
to be unobtrusive and free from psychoanalytical jargon in his analysis, the 
result is a very modern John Adams, trapped between a compulsion for self-
sacrifice and a desperate ambition for success and fame. The pattern for 
Adams, says Shaw, was to work hard, diligently, and relatively unflamboy-
antly at his task, consciously eschewing personal ambition, and then to 
complain querulously afterwards because those who were less compulsive 
and more self-advertising had all the fun and got most of the credit. Oc-
casionally Shaw's tendency to "spot the Freudian slip" is annoying — Adams 
cannot be allowed to correct or cross out or misdate his manuscripts without 
the action being seen of great psychological significance — but on the whole 
this is a measured and likeable performance. 
While the traditional emphasis on political independence and the ruling 
elites which brought it about remains not only visible but even dominant in 
the literature of the Bicentennial, Carl Becker's "who shall rule at home?" 
theme has persisted, badly fragmented. Only a handful of scholars have pur-
sued it in its familiar formulation, while many have been sliding over into 
studies not of those politically active but of those exploited by the politically 
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active. The nature of the internal conflict has changed from political fac-
tionalism to general repression, reflecting the accelerating alienation of 
many intellectuals with American society. 
One of the few books which deals in the old "progressive" categories of 
Becker and Charles Beard is Charles S. Olton's Artisans for Independence: 
Philadelphia Mechanics and the American Revolution (Syracuse, N. Y., 
Syracuse University Press, 1975). As Olton admits, Philadelphia was not 
typically American, being the nation's most populous and sophisticated city. 
In Philadelphia, most artisans were independent craftsmen, for entrepreneur-
ship was easy and normal, while wages for journeymen and costs of appren-
tices were high. Olton's men in leather aprons were "a bourgeoisie, not a 
proletariat", and the main thrust of the book is to insist that such men were 
part of the American Revolution too. Never excluded from government, the 
artisans were able to seize their opportunities and by the 1770s push more 
"radically" for independence than the merchant elite which had begun the 
protests. As small manufacturers the artisans needed protection from 
British finished goods. Ultimately, these men realized that their economic 
interests were fundamentally in agreement with the merchant elite and 
opposed to those of the western farmers who ran Pennsylvania during the 
revolutionary years. Both artisans and merchants wanted a protective tariff, 
a national bank, and expanded trade, and both backed the Constitution of 
1787 wholeheartedly. 
The great spokesman for the Philadelphia artisans was, of course, Tom 
Paine, the subject of several recent studies. Paine was bound to be fashionable 
in 1975, for he was the only influential "working class" revolutionary figure, 
and one of the few links between the American Revolution and popular move-
ments of discontent on the European continent. Moreover, Paine poses 
some fascinating questions for biographers. How did this obscure corset-
maker come to spring, full-blown, as the greatest pamphleteer of the eighteenth 
century? What was the nature of his popular appeal? How to explain the two 
unconsumated marriages, the alcoholism, the dissipation and indolence 
between spurts of journalistic genius, the restless wanderings? Given his 
attractions, it is little surprise that Paine keeps being rediscovered. 
Audrey Williamson's Thomas Paine: his life, work and times (London, 
Allen & Unwin, 1973) can be quickly dismissed. First to appear of the new 
studies, it is badly-written, thinly researched, and fatally marred by its 
author's continual comparisons of Paine with others whose biographies she 
has written. Williamson's intentions are good; she seeks to rehabilitate Paine 
from the contemporary revelations about his private life, but is not very 
convincing. More satisfactory is David Freeman Hawke's Thomas Paine 
(New York, Harper and Row, 1974), a full-scale biography, although Hawke's 
obvious impatience with Paine's inconsistencies (he accepts and is not 
bothered by the revelations of dissipation) make the book occasionally 
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sound more hostile to its subject than is intended. Nevertheless, Hawke nicely 
balances Paine's activities on three stages: America, France, and Britain; 
he is particularly good on the American (chiefly Pennsylvanian) side of the 
story. 
Eric Foner's Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1976) is not a biography, but an intellectual study which 
attempts to relate Paine to his American audiences. At times Paine disappears 
for pages, for Foner is more interested in the Philadelphia milieu than in the 
pamphleteer who operated within it. Tom Paine came to Philadelphia in 1774 
after years of personal failure and total disenchantment with English life. 
His angry hostility to Britain and its hereditary ruling classes, his exhilaration 
at the seeming openness and egalitarianism of America, and his non-academic 
brilliance at cutting through cant with a fresh approach and a telling phrase, 
made Common Sense and most of Paine's subsequent journalism particularly 
effective. Paine was angry, less at British repression of all people than of the 
lack of opportunity afforded for independent artisans and farmers. These 
individuals, rather than the lower orders whose irrational moblike behaviour 
he did not at all admire, were his disinherited. He was a neuvo homo, a self-
made cosmopolitan figure quite uncommon among artisans, and his quick 
and skeptical mind had no time for arguments based upon the past. He spoke 
for the best instincts of Anglo-American independent labourers and crafts-
men, men who sought to equate personal virtue with productive individual 
enterprise (at least until The Age of Reason put him beyond the compre-
hension of most of them). Like the Philadelphia artisans, Paine supported the 
Constitution of 1787 because it promised economic prosperity. 
Despite all his personal failings and intellectual inconsistencies, Paine re-
mains a far more attractive figure than his counterpart in Boston as spokes-
man for the middling sort, Samuel Adams. Pauline Maier — and others — 
have made a valiant effort at refurbishing Adams' image, and it is certainly 
true — as she insists — that he was a man of personal asceticism and personal 
rectitude, qualities not unusual among revolutionaries.7 But Paine wrote in 
the abstract, and Adams (far too much) in the heat of daily battle. Maier 
glosses over the main charge against Adams, which is that he was a manipula-
tor of men and events, justifying lies in the interests of the larger cause. 
Nevertheless, the appeal and audience of Adams and Paine was remarkably 
similar. 
From Boston and Philadelphia we move to a different world of farms and 
plantations. Maryland's internal conflicts are well described in Ronald 
7 Pauline Maier, "'Coming to Terms with Sam Adams", American Historical Review, 81 
(1976), pp. 12-37; see also Charles W. Akers, "Sam Adams — And Much More", The New 
England Quarterly, XLVII (1974), pp. 120-31, and James M. OToole, "The Historical 
Interpretations of Sam Adams", The New England Quarterly, XLIX (1976), pp. 82-96. 
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Hoffman's A Spirit of Dissension: Economics, Politics, and the Revolution 
in Maryland (Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). 
Hoffman emphasizes that the leaders of the Revolution in Maryland were 
essentially conservative, but imaginative and innovative at the same time. 
They ultimately consolidated the power of the ruling elite of merchants 
and planters in the state by co-opting the more "popular" leaders, and by 
producing a legislative programme designed to appeal to the average voter, 
anchored by a more equitable system of taxation (which did not spare the 
rich) and an inflationary currency policy which favoured the debtor. Hoff-
man's arguments go a fair way to explaining how the American elites were 
able to retain their power in the swirling uncertainties of the revolutionary 
period. They made concessions and remained open to the demands of those 
who elected them. 
Edmund S. Morgan's American Slavery—American Freedom: The Ordeal 
of Colonial Virginia (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1975) adds sub-
stantially to the story of the leadership's maintenance of power, and intro-
duces into it the problem of Negro slavery, which was not only Virginia's 
ordeal but that of the American republic which emerged from the Revolution. 
The preservation of the institution of slavery has always been one of the 
blackest marks against the founding fathers, since it so clearly makes a 
mockery of the rhetoric of independence. There is some danger of moral 
relativism here, for it is plain that most contemporaries accepted the institu-
tion without question (as they did the inferior position of other segments of 
American society, such as women). If the fathers are to be condemned for 
their attitudes toward blacks which we know to be morally reprehensible, can 
we stop short of condemning them for all the "injustices" laid bare by 
rapidly changing modern attitudes? Some historians are prepared to take the 
argument to its logical conclusion, but most are not. 
In any event, Morgan takes up Cecilia Kenyon's previously mentioned 
throw-away lines about the irony of Jefferson's position, and converts them 
into a major theme of a fascinating book, perhaps the more exciting because 
its author is not an angry young radical but an established scholar of con-
siderable seniority and reputation. His book tells the story of how the 
wealthy Virginia planters clawed their way to success, and how they re-
mained on top. It is not a very pretty picture. Morgan is not persuaded that 
racism (as opposed to bondage) has such deep historical roots as others have 
argued. His point is that enslaving the African because of his race was a very 
neat way of providing the needed labour force for the tobacco fields and 
forming a working understanding between the colony's wealthy planter 
leaders and its less well-off white inhabitants. Negro slavery enabled Virginia 
to set its poor apart, and racism, by absorbing in Virginia "the fear and 
contempt that men in England . . . felt for the inarticulate lower classes . . . 
made it possible for White Virginians to develop a devotion to the equality 
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that English republicans had declared to be the soul of liberty". Equality 
among men was a reality in Virginia because slaves were not men, a nice 
piece of sleight-of-mind. Virginia had few free poor, and its planter leaders 
were thus enabled to produce the documents which composed the revolution-
ary vision of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness". 
The recent literature on slavery would require a separate essay to produce 
any coherence,8 but particularly significant is David Brion Davis's magis-
terial The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution 1770-1823 (Ithaca 
and London, Cornell University Press, 1975), a continuation of his work 
begun in The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (Ithaca and London, 
Cornell University Press, 1967). From the international perspective of Davis, 
the significant feature about slavery was that this period did see the dis-
integration of the automatic acceptance of slavery as a legitimate institution, 
although down to 1823 the proponents of slavery fought a fierce rear-guard 
action which in the short-run was remarkably successful. Davis is particularly 
good at dissecting the factors which allowed the slaveholders to survive, 
though he points out that only in the United States did a slave-based society 
have much real geopolitical coherence. Not much concerned with the path-
ology of reform, Davis is fascinated by the pathology of slaveholding, argu-
ing that racism was a cover for "more fundamental issues of ideology and 
power". The fundamental issue was exploitation, and the problem was that 
the question of slavery could be — and was — separated from other forms of 
barbarity and oppression because it was so obviously intolerable and un-
tenable. 
On a much more limited front is Gerald Mullin's Flight and Rebellion: 
Slave Resistance in Eighteenth-Century Virginia (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1972), in many respects a companion-piece to the study by Morgan. 
This impressive work seeks to isolate, identify, and explain the nature of 
black culture in the age of revolution. Mullin emphasizes the paradox that 
the black Africans became both more comprehensible to whites and more 
dangerous as they became assimilated into Virginia society. He outlines the 
subtle effects which the owning of slaves had upon their masters; like Davis, 
he is captivated with the curious ways in which power corrupts and exploita-
tion brings dependence to the exploiter. But mostly, Mullin is concerned to 
show that the Virginia slave culture had its own dimensions and rules which 
simply could not be comprehended by white society. Most obviously, those 
actions by slaves which contemporaries saw as evidence of their inferiority 
or non-humanity — lack of discipline, childish disobedience, indolence — 
were really acts of rebellion against their situation, sometimes spontaneous, 
8 See Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross (2 vol., Boston, Little, 
Brown, 1974), and Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made 
(London, Andre Deutsch, 1975). 
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increasingly socialized, and eventually even calculated. Mullin's insight 
represents the dawning perception of a new history. It is in part an awareness 
of those people which history has traditionally neglected, but it also recog-
nizes that such people cannot always be explained in terms of the categories 
of the dominant historical society. The problem is to comprehend the opera-
tive rules of the neglected segments, and the techniques are often more 
anthropological than historical. 
Perhaps the most significant work which attempts to grapple with such 
complex epistemological problems is a collection of essays by younger 
scholars edited by Alfred F. Young and entitled The American Revolution: 
Explorations in the History of American Radicalism (DeKalb, Illinois, 
Northern Illinois Press, 1976). The title is a bit deceptive. As Young points 
out in his Foreword, the authors of the pieces included here are not united 
by a common political ideology, and the title, which is clearly Young's, 
probably suggests that he rather hoped they would be. What these articles 
do have in common is an acknowledged debt to the writings of four modern 
British scholars — E. P. Thompson, George Rude, Eric Hobsbawm, and 
Christopher Hill — all pioneers in attempting to comprehend historically the 
aspirations of the lower orders of European (mainly English) society.9 The 
historical study of the culture and ideology of the people is still very much 
in its infancy, and has in my judgment been limited by the inclination of most 
practitioners to extend the assumptions of traditional history (turned upside-
down) to a new segment of the population of the past. Much of the emphasis, 
therefore, has been on the development of a political consciousness, and 
much of the approach one of radical dialectic. 
Thompson, Rude, and Hobsbawm have all stressed that the "mobs" of 
eighteenth-century England (and for Rude, France) were not the disorgan-
ized mindless collections of the discontented which the ruling classes saw, 
but had a purpose of their own. In Thompson's phrase, echoed in many of 
the essays in the Young volume, the mobs had their own "moral economy", 
a coherent set of assumptions and objectives which gave them form. Far too 
much attention is given to the American mob — urban and rural — in the 
essays of this splendid collection, and too much attempt is made to find a 
positive political direction. Several of the essays, however, are less con-
cerned to document the tiny seedlings of American radicalism at the time of 
9 See particularly E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London, 1963), 
and "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century", Past and 
Present, L (1971), pp. 76-136; George Rude, The Crowd in the French Revolution (Oxford, 
1959), and Paris and London in the Eighteenth Century: Studies in Popular Protest (London, 
1970); Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in 
the 19th and20th Centuries (Manchester, 1959); Eric Hobsbawm and George Rude, Captain 
Swing (London, 1969); Christopher Hill, Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary 
England (London, 1964). 
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the Revolution than to explore other dimensions of popular feeling at the 
time, attempting to get beyond engaging in an unconscious collaboration 
with the more traditional elite historians in seeing political consciousness 
as the heart of the American Revolution. This is clearly an important and 
probably prophetic book, anticipating a major direction in future American 
studies in its efforts to come to grips with the neglected 80% of the population. 
One regrets it has not had wider distribution through a commercial publisher. 
We all know John Adams' famous dictum that one-third of the colonists 
supported the Revolution, one-third opposed it, and the remainder did not 
care. Adams clearly intended to criticize the apathetic third. How could they 
not become involved? The answer may be that the "apathetic" were marching 
to entirely different drummers, for the political issues of the revolutionary 
elite had no real meaning for their lives. On the whole, the apolitical by their 
lack of commitment tacitly supported the status quo. They were galvanized 
into action only when invading armies forced them to make a decision, and 
then their involvement was both unwilling and shortlived. 
Such a pattern can be observed for women in the revolutionary period. The 
history of women is yet another expanding field of study, though most of the 
literature remains in journal articles, and we do not yet have anything ap-
proaching a synthesis. It would require a separate essay to discuss the many 
studies cited in Joan Hoff Wilson's contribution to the Young volume already 
noted, but significantly, she begins by observing that "by themselves women 
seldom fit into the power and prestige categories that characterize standard 
textbook accounts of this nation's development". The "powerless" in Ameri-
can society simply were not equipped to use the revolution to improve their 
own situation even had they recognized the opportunity. Wilson's essay is 
devoted largely to demonstrating women's lack of power and the reasons for 
it, and makes a good job of it. In the process she quite deliberately em-
phasizes that most women could not be revolutionaries, simply because their 
position in society was not sufficiently integrated with the cultural assump-
tions of the politicized groups. A similar conclusion can be drawn from Mary 
Beth Norton's study of Loyalist women, based upon the records of the 
Loyalist Claims Commission.10 In Wilson's word, they were not "modernized". 
Interestingly, in the course of the uncovering of new layers of American 
society, recent scholarship has had to come to terms with the Loyalists. One 
main trend in Loyalist study of recent vintage has been to humanize the 
Loyalist leadership, the other to attempt to understand the aspirations of 
the rank-and-file. The first approach, largely through the medium of biography, 
has tended to reduce the disparity of thought between patriot and Loyalist 
leaders. This is very nearly self-evident, since, as James Kirby Martin has 
10 Mary Beth Norton, "Eighteenth Century American Women in Peace and War: The Case 
of the Loyalists", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XXXIII (1976), pp. 386-409. 
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demonstrated, Loyalist leaders came from essentially the same class of elite 
as the rebel ones, although the former were perhaps more cosmopolitan in 
their interests. In one sense, the Loyalism of the elite is almost accidental, 
a product of their pattern of officeholding after 1763. Because they were 
"ins", they found themselves on the wrong side of the growing movement 
of opposition to Britain, however much they had in common with the rebels. 
Thomas Hutchinson and Jonathan Sewall of Massachusetts, both subjects 
of recent biographies, were American Whigs who found themselves on the 
wrong side and ended up unhappily exiled in Britain, conscious of their 
irrelevance to British society and very homesick. 
Bernard Bailyn's The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson (Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1974) is a brilliant and sympathetic study of the 
villain of Massachusetts. It is curious that both Edmund S. Morgan and 
Bailyn (contemporaries of equal scholarly stature teaching at Yale and 
Harvard respectively) have chosen to grace the Bicentennial with books 
which have the word "Ordeal" in their titles. Morgan's ordeal refers to a 
society which trapped itself in inconsistency, while Bailyn's is to an individual 
who could not stop a movement he could not understand. Bailyn's Hutchin-
son is intelligent, sensitive, cultured, and out of step with the escalating 
events around him. His enemies are all lesser men. Hutchinson's tragedy was 
not so much to lose as to fail to comprehend why he had lost. 
Hutchinson remained in exile in the mother country, but Jonathan Sewall 
and his family came to British North America after the peace. Carol Berkin's 
Jonathan Sewall: Odyssey of an American Loyalist (New York and London, 
Columbia University Press, 1975) attempts to explain why. Sewall was far 
more hostile to the aspirations of the "people" than was Hutchinson, and his 
exile was even more bitter and poignant. He ultimately decided, probably 
quite correctly, that the sons of a colonial lawyer and ex-official would be 
much better off as big fish in the small pond of Canada. Like most other 
Loyalist leaders who sought office for themselves or their sons in British 
North America, Sewall's actions were simply a continuation of his previous 
climb to success through official preferment, although now the quest was 
marked by an angry conviction that Britain owed him something for his 
loyalty. Berkin's is a good solid biography of an interesting man, although we 
probably could have benefitted from more extensive quotations from Sewall's 
writings. 
It is on the basis of the evidence of people like Sewall, his family, and circle 
of friends (which included Ward Chipman and Edward Winslow) that most 
generalizations about the Loyalist mentality in British North America are 
based. We have only scattered hints of the sentiments of the vast majority 
of Loyalists, although the second trend in Loyalist studies — to investigate 
the powerless segments — has offered some new material. The Blacks, for 
example, have been the subjects of two recently published studies, James W. 
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St. G. Walker's The Black Loyalists: The Search for a Promised Land in 
Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone 1783-1870 (London and Halifax, Longman and 
Dalhousie University Press, 1976) and Ellen Gibson Wilson's The Loyal 
Blacks (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1976). Wilson's work is stronger on 
the American background, and Walker's far more solid on the African ex-
perience. Walker notes the small percentage of field hands among the Black 
Loyalists; those blacks most likely to be motivated toward earning or extend-
ing their freedom through Loyalism were the more assimilated household 
servants and skilled artisans. This point throws into bold relief the poignant 
paradox of the Sierra Leone venture — those transported from Nova Scotia 
to Africa were the most highly Americanized blacks — and of the Nova 
Scotia experience as well, for these skilled workers were unable to find em-
ployment in a province desperately short of skills. As both books demon-
strate, however Americanized were the Black Loyalists, by no stretch of the 
imagination were they either eighteenth-century Whigs who had consciously 
chosen to remain in the Empire or ideological Tories. Their commitment to 
the British cause was understandably narrow and self-interested. As Walker 
emphasizes, they could not obtain in Nova Scotia what they really wanted: 
land and work to become eighteenth-century Americans. 
We could well use similar studies of the Indian Loyalists, the Highlander 
Loyalists, the white farmer Loyalists. The Highlanders were recent emigrants 
from a collapsing semi-feudal society, not yet Americanized, and like the 
Black Loyalists and the Indian Loyalists and the "Late" Loyalists, they 
wanted land and a chance to be left alone. None of these groups brought 
to British North America the political and cultural values which had made a 
Revolution possible. They may have had a developing collective conscious-
ness, but it was limited to their own kind and did not yet extend in politicized 
directions. There is a tendency to derogate Loyalists who lacked political 
pretensions, who simply wanted land and a chance to prosper, but Loyalism 
appears to have had a particularly strong popular appeal among the pre-modern 
segments of American society with just such simple ambitions.11 Such people 
joined the French-Canadian habitants, who by rejecting American liberation 
were also, in some senses, Loyalists. Many of the cultural differences usually 
attributed to the Loyalists were not a product of political ideology, but of their 
lack of integration into revolutionary American society. What would be 
Canada was something clearly different from the United States as a result 
of their coming. 
Are the Americans entitled to be pleased with their Revolution? On the 
11 These remarks are only another way of reaffirming and reapproaching the insights of 
William Nelson's The American Tory (Oxford, 1961) and the too quickly rejected "fragment" 
thesis of Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United 
States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia (New York, 1964). 
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basis of current scholarship, the answer would be a highly-qualified "yes". 
Political independence was a major accomplishment which reflected the 
ambitions and needs of the majority of the society which brought it about. 
The qualification, of course, is that revolutionary American society did not 
include large segments of the population. There seems no escaping the facts 
that revolutionary leadership constituted a ruling class, that the politically 
active population (even including farmers and artisans) were an elite, and 
that most of the thirteen colonies' three million people were neither deliber-
ate actors in nor immediate beneficiaries of the drama which unfolded. 
Whether Americans can or should be satisfied with such a limited achieve-
ment, is, of course, another question. 
